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Wrongful Conception: North Carolina's Newest Prenatal Tort
Claim-Jackson v. Bumgardner
The area of prenatal torts, including wrongful birth,1 wrongful life,2 and
more recently, wrongful conception, 3 has witnessed exponential growth over the
last twenty years. Unlike claims for wrongful birth or wrongful life, which are
often rejected by the courts, wrongful conception generally is accepted as a sub-
species of medical malpractice.4 The controversy in wrongful conception cases
arises over the determination of damages, fueled by conflicting policy considera-
tions involving highly sensitive issues.5
The North Carolina Supreme Court's recent recognition of a cause of ac-
tion for wrongful conception in Jackson v. Bumgardner6 arrives in the wake of
its prior decision in Azzolino v. Dingfelder,7 the State's first wrongful birth-
wrongful life case. Wrongful conception occurs when "the wrongful act of a
third party, usually a physician or pharmacist, interfere[s] with contraceptive or
birth control measures adopted or elected by the parents so that an unintended
child [comes] into being." 8 The upshot of both wrongful birth and wrongful life
claims, on the other hand, is that the doctor's negligence deprived the parents of
the opportunity to abort the fetus to avoid its subsequent birth. 9 The wrongful
conception claim thus differs from both wrongful birth and wrongful life in that
it is generally understood to involve preconception, rather than postconception,
negligence. 10 Although the court's decision in Jackson is consistent with the
1. Wrongful birth is a "claim for relief brought by the parents of a child born with genetic
defects or other abnormalities discoverable during the first trimester of pregnancy." Note, Azzolino
v. Dingfelder: North Carolina Court of Appeals Recognizes Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life
Claims, 63 N.C.L. Rtv. 1329, 1332 (1985).
2. Wrongful life is an action maintained "by or on behalf of a defective child who alleges that
but for the defendant's negligent treatment or advice to its parents, the child would not have been
born." Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 107, 337 S.E.2d 528, 531 (1985); see also Comment,
The Trend Toward Judicial Recognition of Wrongful Life: A Dissenting View, 31 UCLA L. REv.
473, 473 (1983) ("[W]rongful lfe is a claim brought on behalfofa... defective infant against a third
party" for the third party's negligent failure "to inform the child's parents that the child might be
born defective ....").
3. See infra text accompanying note 8.
4. Holt, Wrongful Pregnancy, 33 S.C.L. REv. 759, 759 (1982).
5. Id. at 761-63.
6. 318 N.C. 172, 347 S.E.2d 743 (1986).
7. 315 N.C. 103, 337 S.E.2d 528 (1985).
8. Holt, supra note 4, at 759.
9. See, eg., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967) (physician negligently
informed expectant mother that her contraction of measles would not affect her unborn child's
health).
10. In wrongful life cases the alleged harm to the child results from being born with a nontreat-
able disability, whereas wrongful birth is a claim brought by the child's parents for the doctor's
negligent prenatal treatment. In both of these situations the fact of conception is not a basis for a
negligence claim against the physician. Wrongful conception, on the other hand, is an action based
on the physician's negligent failure to provide or perform the prescribed method of birth control.
See Note, Lifesaving Medical Treatment for the Nonviable Fetus: Limitations on State Authority
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majority view regarding wrongful conception claims, heated debate over the is-
sue of damages in such claims continues. 1
This Note analyzes Jackson in light of Azzolino and examines in particular
the Jackson court's definition of "legal injury" in relation to the assessment of
damages. It concludes that the court, by departing from traditional principles of
medical malpractice, placed an artificial cap on damages in wrongful conception
cases. In so doing the court deprived plaintiffs in Jackson of their right to a full
remedy.
In January 1979 Varonica Jackson was admitted to Betsy Johnson Memo-
rial Hospital in Lillington, North Carolina after consulting her physician regard-
ing "abnormal uterine bleeding." 12  Dr. Heath Bumgardner, a licensed
physician, performed a dilation and curettage (D & C) 13 and a cervical biopsy. 14
Mrs. Jackson previously had been fitted with an intrauterine device (IUD).15
She and her husband, Rufus Jackson, alleged that they had informed Dr. Bum-
gardner of their limited financial means and inability to bear the responsibility of
raising additional children. 16 They claimed that Dr. Bumgardner had promised
to maintain the IUD in place, or reinsert it if the procedure warranted its re-
moval, and that he later represented to Mrs. Jackson that the IUD had been
maintained in place or reinserted.17
Mrs. Jackson's physical discomfort continued until April 1979, when she
Under Roe v. Wade, 54 FORDHAM L. Rav. 961, 962 n.7 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Lifesaving Medi-
cal Treatment]. Although wrongful birth and wrongful pregnancy claims are now widely recog-
nized, a claim for wrongful life generally is not actionable. See Note, Wrongful Pregnancy: Recovery
for Raising a Healthy Child, 10 N. KY. L. Rav. 341, 341-43 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Recovery].
11. See generally Holt, supra note 4, at 785-86 (noting courts' problems in accepting the crea-
tion of a human being as a compensable wrong); Note, Flowers v. District of Columbia: Another
Court Refuses to Settle the Question of Damages in Wrongful Conception Cases, 34 CATH. U.L. REv.
1209, 1212-24 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Damages] (noting that the question of damages remains
unsettled due to courts' inconsistent emphasis on various policy considerations); Note, Wrongful
Birth: The Avoidance of Consequences Doctrine in Mitigation of Damages, 53 FORDHAM L. REv.
1107, 1114-15 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Wrongful Birth] (noting the avoidance of consequences lan-
guage used by some courts to hold that failure to abort a child or place it for adoption indicates that
benefits of raising a child outweigh its costs); Note, Wrongful Conception: Who Paysfor Bringing Up
Baby?, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 418, 428 (1978) [hereinafter Note, Who Pays?] (discussing the sub-
stantial controversy over grounds of recovery for wrongful conception and extent of recoverable
damages); Note, Recovery, supra note 10, at 344 (noting that courts are "sharply divided over the
issue of damages, particularly for the costs of rearing a healthy child").
12. Jackson, 318 N.C. at 174, 347 S.E.2d at 744.
13. Id. A D & C is "an operation in which the cervix of the uterus is dilated by means of an
instrument and the interior of the uterus is then scraped out.., by means of a curet .... The
procedure is used both as a means of making a diagnosis ... and as a treatment, by removing
growths or overgrown tissue." 1 SCHMIDT'S ATrORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE D-1 (17th ed.
1982) [hereinafter SCHMIDT'S].
14. Jackson, 318 N.C. at 174, 347 S.E.2d at 744. A biopsy involves the removal and examina-
tion of "some tissue, secretion, or other material from the living body, for the purpose of determining
the nature of an illness or suspected illness." 1 SCHMIDT'S, supra note 13, at B-58.
15. Jackson, 318 N.C. at 174, 347 S.E.2d at 745. An IUD is a "mechanical device placed into
the interior of the uterus for the purpose of preventing pregnancy." 2 SCHMIDT'S, supra note 13, at
1-86. Although the IUD's success in preventing conception remains a mystery, the prevailing theory
is that the device produces a slight irritation that prevents the ovum from implanting itself into the
lining membrane of the uterus. Id. at 1-86 to -87.
16. Jackson, 318 N.C. at 174, 347 S.E.2d at 745.
17. Id. at 174, 347 S.E.2d at 744.
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was readmitted to the same hospital for exploratory surgery. 18 As with the pre-
vious surgical procedure, plaintiffs alleged that they had voiced their concerns
about reinsertion of the IUD, and that once again Dr. Bumgardner had assured
them he would replace the IUD should its removal become necessary during the
course of the surgery. 19 On April 3, 1979, the doctor operated on Mrs. Jackson
"for a suspected ovarian cyst."' 20 On July 22, 1980, Mrs. Jackson discovered
that she was pregnant.2 1 The Jacksons contended that the ILrD was never rein-
serted following the April 1979 surgery. 22 Mrs. Jackson gave birth to a healthy
baby in February 1981.23
The Jacksons instituted a civil action in contract and tort against Dr. Bum-
gardner on July 22, 1981.24 The tort claim was in essence an action for medical
malpractice. 25 It alleged wrongful conception or wrongful pregnancy arising
from defendant's alleged negligent failure to reinsert the IUD and from his al-
leged failure to notify plaintiffs of its removal, resulting in the birth of a child.26
The second cause of action against Dr. Bumgardner was for breach of an alleged
oral contract to replace the IUD following surgery. 27 As damages, the Jacksons
sought both costs in connection with Mrs. Jackson's pregnancy and future ex-
penses for the maintenance and support of their child. 28
Pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure,29
the trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
for which relief could be granted,30 and plaintiffs appealed. The North Carolina
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, 3 1 noting that it previously had recog-
nized a wrongful conception claim in Pierce v. Piver.32 This type of action, the
18. Id.
19. Id. at 174, 347 S.E.2d at 745.
20. Id. at 174, 347 S.E.2d at 744.
21. Id. at 174, 347 S.E.2d at 745.
22. Id. The complaint did not specify whether Dr. Bumgardner failed to reinsert the IUD after
performing the first operation or the second. For statute of limitations purposes, however, plaintiffs'
claim was timely filed, one year after Mrs. Jackson discovered that she was pregnant. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-15 (1983).
23. Jackson, 318 N.C. at 174, 347 S.E.2d at 745. A cause of action for wrongful conception
usually is brought by parents of a healthy, normal infant. See Note, Recovery, supra note 10, at 341.
In situations in which the child is born disabled, a wrongful birth/wrongful life claim may be
brought simultaneously. The computation of damages in such a situation differs from the computa-
tion in a situation involving only a wrongful conception claim. See, e.g., Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa.
Super. 342, 408 A.2d 496 (1979) (parents permitted to recover for the extraordinary costs of raising
child afflicted with neurofibromatosis), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110
(1981).
24. Jackson, 318 N.C. at 174, 347 S.E.2d at 745.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 177, 347 S.E.2d at 746.
27. Id. at 185, 347 S.E.2d at 751.
28. Id. at 177, 347 S.E.2d at 746.
29. N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
30. Jackson, 318 N.C. at 174, 347 S.E.2d at 745.
31. Jackson v. Bumgardner, 71 N.C. App. 107, 112, 321 S.E.2d 541, 545 (1984), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 318 N.C. 172, 347 S.E.2d 743 (1986).
32. 45 N.C. App. 111, 262 S.E.2d 320 (1980); see infra text accompanying notes 118-23 (dis-
cussing Pierce). The Jackson court did not distinguish between wrongful pregnancy and wrongful
conception claims in its opinion. Jackson, 318 N.C. at 178, 347 S.E.2d at 747. The two types of
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Jackson court held, was "simply a species of malpractice which allows recovery
from a tortfeasor in the presence of an injury caused by intentional or negligent
conduct." '33
On review, the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld a cause of action for
wrongful conception. 34 The court denied child-rearing costs, however, on the
two-pronged theory that life could never be a legal injury and that even if it
were, the speculative nature of damages precluded recovery. 35
The court's decision in Jackson was premised in large part on its recent
holding in Azzolino, even though Azzolino did not involve a claim for wrongful
conception. In Azzolino the parents of a child born with Down's syndrome filed
suit on behalf of the child for wrongful life, and on their own behalf for wrongful
birth.36 The parents claimed that defendants' negligent prenatal care of the
mother, including defendants' alleged failure to advise them properly regarding
the availability of amniocentesis 37 and other genetic care,38 deprived them of the
option to abort the child.39 Amniocentesis performed at the proper stage of the
mother's pregnancy would have revealed that the child was afflicted with
Down's syndrome, a mentally and physically crippling genetic disorder.40
The North Carolina Supreme Court dismissed both the wrongful life and
wrongful birth claims and held that neither stated a recognizable cause of action.
Noting the complex issues that other courts have faced in dealing with claims
for wrongful life, the court declined to present its own view, holding instead that
claims, however, are materially distinct. See infra notes 51-60 and accompanying text. Jackson is
more properly viewed as a wrongful conception case.
33. Jackson, 71 N.C. App. at 110, 321 S.E.2d at 544.
34. Jackson, 318 N.C. at 182, 347 S.E.2d at 749.
35. Id. at 182-83, 347 S.E.2d at 749-50.
36. Azzolino, 315 N.C. at 105, 337 S.E.2d at 530. The parents also brought an additional claim
on behalf of the siblings, alleging that the siblings also had suffered harm as a result of the defective
child's birth. The court affirmed the trial court's directed verdict for defendants. Id. at 117, 337
S.E.2d at 537.
37. Amniocentesis is a standard diagnostic procedure performed to detect biochemical and
chromosomal defects, including Down's syndrome. Elias & Verp, Prenatal Diagnosis of Genetic
Disorders, 12 OBSTET. GYNECOL. ANN. 79, 79-80 (1983).
38. Genetic care or genetic counseling involves the use of various medical procedures including
ultrasonography, roentgenography, and fetoscopy, in addition to amniocentesis to detect genetic de-
fects in unborn fetuses. Id. at 79; see Gallagher v. Duke Univ., 639 F. Supp. 979 (M.D.N.C. 1986).
39. Azzolino, 315 N.C. at 105, 337 S.E.2d at 530. Plaintiffs named three defendants in their
complaint: Orange-Chatham Comprehensive Health Services, Inc. (OCCHS); Dr. James
Dingfelder, an obstretics and gynecology specialist at the University of North Carolina School of
Medicine; and Jean Dowdy, a registered nurse and family nurse practitioner employed by OCCHS at
the Haywood-Moncure Clinic (Clinic). Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 71 N.C. App. 289, 291, 322 S.E.2d
567, 571 (1984), rev'd, 315 N.C. 103, 337 S.E.2d 528 (1985). Dr. Dingfelder worked at the Clinic
one-half day per week, during which he supervised the family nurse practitioners and provided other
gynecological and obstetrical services to patients. Id. at 292, 322 S.E.2d at 571.
The Azzolinos sued Dr. Dingfelder for his own negligence and also for the negligence of his
nurse on a respondeat superior theory. Id. at 312, 322 S.E.2d at 583. The court of appeals held that
Dr. Dingfelder could not be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior because the nurse
was not found to be negligent. The court, however, did find that he was personally negligent in
informing Mrs. Azzolino that amniocentesis was not necessary for a woman under 37 years of age.
Id. at 312-18, 322 S.E.2d at 583-86.
40. Azzolino, 315 N.C. at 105, 337 S.E.2d at 530.
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"[a]bsent clear legislative guidance to the contrary, '41 it found compelling the
view of the New York Court of Appeals that
"[w]hether it is better never to have been born at all than to have been
born with even gross deficiencies is a mystery more properly to be left
to the philosophers and the theologians .... [There is] no predicate at
common law or in statutory enactment for judicial recognition of the
birth of a defective child as an injury to the child .... " 42
The Azzolino court similarly rejected the parents' claim for wrongful birth.
It assumed arguendo that defendants had breached a duty to the plaintiffs. 43
Whether this breach of duty was the proximate cause of plaintiffs' "injury" was
problematic, however, "since even the plaintiffs acknowledge[d] that the fetus
... was in existence and already genetically defective at the time the defendants
first came into contact with the plaintiffs." 44 Even assuming, however, that de-
fendants' breach proximately resulted in the birth of the disabled child, the court
was unwilling to extend this tort analysis to include the concept that life could
ever be a legal injury:
In order to allow recovery... courts must then take a step into entirely
untraditional analysis by holding that the existence of a human life can
constitute an injury cognizable at law. Far from being "traditional"
tort analysis, such a step requires a view of human life previously un-
known to the law of this jurisdiction.45
The Azzolino court declined to apply "the traditional theories of tort law"
under which "defendants are liable for all of the reasonably foreseeable results of
their negligent acts or omissions."'46 Applying such an analysis required placing
a pecuniary value on human life, an idea that the court found riddled with
problems.47 As peripheral issues, the Azzolino court noted the dilemma other
courts have encountered with regard to a plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages,48
41. Id. at 109, 337 S.E.2d at 533.
42. Id. at 109, 337 S.E.2d at 533 (quoting Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 411-412, 386
N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900-01 (1978)).
43. Id. at 110, 337 S.E.2d at 533.
44. Id. at 110-11, 337 S.E.2d at 533.
45. Id. at 111, 337 S.E.2d at 533-34.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 112-13, 337 S.E.2d at 534. The Azzolino court noted the ethical uncertainties faced by
courts when trying to place a pecuniary value on human life:
"Although courts and commentators have attempted to make it such, wrongful birth
is not an ordinary tort. It is one thing to compensate destruction; it is quite another to
compensate creation. This so-called 'wrong' is unique: It is a new and ongoing condition.
As life, it necessarily interacts with other lives. Indeed, it draws its 'injurious' nature from
the predilections of the other lives it touches. It is naive to suggest that such a situation
falls neatly into conventional tort principles, producing neatly calculable damages."
Id. (quoting Note, Wrongful Birth Damages: Mandate and Mishandling by Judicial Fiat, 13 VAL.
U.L. REV. 127, 170 (1978)).
48. Azzolino, 315 N.C. at 112, 337 S.E.2d at 534. See infra note 87; see also infra text accompa-
nying notes 97-98 (argument that parents must mitigate damages either by aborting fetus or placing
child for adoption uniformly rejected as against public policy). The Azzolino court, however, noted
that North Carolina has "tended to discourage holding physicians or nurses liable for not acting in a
manner which will result in abortion." Azzolino, 315 N.C. at 116, 337 S.E.2d at 537.
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as well as the danger of fraudulent claims.49 The court also anticipated that if it
were to allow claims for wrongful birth, it would be difficult to determine the
standard for "defectiveness" required to hold a negligent physician liable.50
Causes of action for wrongful pregnancy or wrongful conception raise con-
cerns similar to those surrounding causes of action for wrongful birth and
wrongful life, but the claims are materially distinct. Moreover, "wrongful preg-
nancy" and "wrongful conception," although conceptually related, are actually
separate claims for relief, even though the terms often are used interchangeably
by claimants.51 The vast majority of wrongful pregnancy or wrongful concep-
tion cases involve the negligent performance of a bilateral tubal ligation, 52
laparosalpingectomy,53 or some other sterilization procedure performed on the
female.5 4 A smaller number arise as the result of a negligently performed vasec-
tomy55 or improper filling of a birth control prescription.56 All of these situa-
49. TheAzzolino court warned, "The temptation will be great for parents, if not to invent.., a
prior desire to abort, to at least deny the possibility that they might have changed their minds and
allowed the child to be born even if they had known of the defects it would suffer." Azzolino, 315
N.C. at 113, 337 S.E.2d at 535 (citing Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 519, 219
N.W.2d 242, 245 (1974)).
50. Id. at 113-14, 337 S.E.2d at 535.
51. See Note, Damages, supra note 11, at 1209-10 n.6.
52. A tubal ligation is a permanent sterilization operation in which the uterine or fallopian
tubes are constricted by means of a ligature or thread. The procedure prevents the ovum from
implanting itself into the uterus. 4 SCHMIDT'S, supra note 13, at T-154. For wrongful conception
cases involving the negligent performance of a bilateral tubal ligation, see McNeal v. United States,
689 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1982); White v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 146 (D. Kan. 1981); Anony-
mous v. Hospital, 35 Conn. Supp. 112, 398 A.2d 312 (1979); Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn.
Supp. 125, 366 A.2d 204 (1976); Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), modi-
fied and aff'd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980); Byrd v. Wesley Medical Center, 237 Kan. 215, 699 P.2d 459 (1985); Macomber v.
Dillman, 505 A.2d 810 (Me. 1986); Sard v. Hardy, 34 Md. App. 217, 367 A.2d 525 (1976), rev'd, 281
Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977); Green v. Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 545, 265 N.W.2d 411 (1978);
Martineau v. Nelson, 311 Minn. 92, 247 N.W.2d 409 (1976); Miller v. Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1982); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975); O'Toole v. Green-
berg, 64 N.Y.2d 427, 477 N.E.2d 445, 488 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1985); Abbariao v. Blumenthal, 107
A.D.2d 556, 483 N.Y.S.2d 296 (1985); Rivera v. New York, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950
(1978); Clegg v. Chase, 89 Misc. 2d 510, 391 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1977); Pierce v. Piver, 45 N.C. App.
111, 262 S.E.2d 320 (1980); Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982); Strib-
ling v. deQuevedo, 288 Pa. Super. 436, 432 A.2d 239 (1980); Vaughn v. Shelton, 514 S.W.2d 870
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1974); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (rex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 927 (1974); McKernan v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411, 687 P.2d 850 (1984); James G. v. Ca-
serta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982).
The tube may also be obstructed through the use of a fallopian ring. See, eg., P. v. Portadin,
179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (1981).
53. Laparosalpingectomy involves the surgical removal of one or both of the uterine tubes
through an incision in the abdominal wall. 2 SCHMIDT's, supra note 13, at L-21. For cases in which
the negligent performance of a laparosalpingectomy formed the basis of a wrongful conception
claim, see Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982); Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d
303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 445 A.2d 883 (1982); Sanders v. H.
Nouri, M.D., Inc., 688 S.W.2d 24 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356
N.E.2d 496 (1976). Sometimes the tube is cauterized rather than removed. See, eg., Hartke v.
McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983); Flowers v. District of
Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073 (D.C. 1984); Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429 (1984).
54. See, eg., Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983); Milde v. Leigh, 75 N.D. 418, 28
N.W.2d 530 (1947).
55. See, e.g., Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982); Cockrum v. Baumgartner,
99 I11. App. 3d 271, 425 N.E.2d 968, rev'd, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1981), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 846 (1983); Doerr v. Villate, 74 Il1. App. 2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966); Garrison v. Foy, 486
1082 [Vol. 65
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tions are properly termed "wrongful conception" because the negligence occurs
during the preconception phase.5 7 Another group of cases falling within the
ambit of this claim, however, are those in which a child is born as the result of
an unsuccessful abortion5 8 or failure to diagnose pregnancy in time for abor-
tion. 59 Because the negligent act or omission takes place after the fact of preg-
nancy, this type of claim is more accurately described as "wrongful
pregnancy2' 60
Wrongful conception has gained increasing acceptance in most jurisdictions
as a valid tort claim,6 1 although a small minority have consistently opposed rec-
N.E.2d 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377 (Ky. 1971); Bushman v. Burns
Clinic Medical Center, 83 Mich. App. 453, 268 N.W.2d 683 (1978); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic,
260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Christensen v. Thorby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934); Wein-
traub v. Brown, 98 A.D.2d 339, 470 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1983); Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 352
N.Y.S.2d 834 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, 408 A.2d 496 (1979), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981); Shaheen v. Knight, 6 Lycoming Rptr. 19, 11
Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (1957); Baldwin v. Sanders, 266 S.C. 394, 223 S.E.2d 602 (1976); Hays v. Hall, 477
S.W.2d 402 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1973); Ball v.
Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
56. See, eg., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971). This type of wrong-
fil conception action usually is brought against a pharmacist, rather than a physician.
57. Jackson, which involved the alleged negligent failure of the physician to reinsert or main-
tain in place an IUD prior to conception, was thus a claim for wrongful conception rather than
wrongful pregnancy.
58. See, eg., Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976); Wilczynski v.
Goodman, 73 Ill. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1979); Mears v. Alhadeff, 88 A.D.2d 827, 451
N.Y.S.2d 133 (1982); Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, 408 A.2d 496 (1979), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981); Miller v. Johnson, 231 Va. 177, 343 S.E.2d 301
(1986).
59. See, eg., Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 Ill. App. 3d 271, 425 N.E.2d 968, rev'd, 95 Ill. 2d
193, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983); Clapham v. Yanga, 102 Mich. App.
47, 300 N.W.2d 727 (1980); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974); Rieck v.
Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
60. One student commentator, however, has suggested that these cases should be included
within the penumbra of wrongful birth on the premise that the wrongdoing is the resulting birth of
the child, rather than the fact of conception or pregnancy. See Note, Wrongful Birth, supra note 11,
at 1107 n.2. The similarity between wrongful conception or wrongful pregnancy claims and claims
for wrongful birth and wrongful life has caused a good deal of confusion among the courts. See
Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 705, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652, 656 (1976) (wrongful life action
brought for negligent performance of an abortion); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084,
1084-85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (wrongful birth suit based on improper tubal ligation); Miller v.
Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183, 184 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (claim for wrongful life or wrongful birth
founded on negligent tubal ligation); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 240, 442 A.2d 1003, 1004
(1982) (wrongful birth action brought for negligently performed tubal ligation); Beardsley v. Wierd-
sma, 650 P.2d 288, 290 (Wyo. 1982) (wrongful birth and wrongful life actions brought for unsuccess-
ful tubal ligations). The wrongful conception claim has even been considered a subcategory of the
wrongful life claim. See Comment, supra note 2, at 473 n.1 (citing Kashi, The Case of the Unwanted
Blessing: Wrongful Life, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1409, 1409-10 (1977)). Wrongful life and wrongful
birth claims, however, are attempts to recover for the birth of a planned child who was born with
disabilities, while wrongful pregnancy or wrongful conception claims usually involve the birth of a
healthy, but unplanned, child. See Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544, 545 n.1 (D.S.C.
1981); Rogers, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpractice in Genetic Counseling and
Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C.L. Rav. 713, 740-41 (1982); Note, Recovery, supra note 10, at 341-42.
61. See, eg., Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982); Anonymous v. Hospital, 35
Conn. Supp. 112, 398 A.2d 312 (1979); Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 126, 366 A.2d 204
(1976); Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth.
v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 314 S.E.2d 653 (1984); Garrison v. Foy, 486 N.E.2d 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985);
Macomber v. Dillman, 505 A.2d 810 (Me. 1986); Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429
(1984); Bushman v. Burns Clinic Medical Center, 83 Mich. App. 453, 268 N.W.2d 683 (1978);
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ognition. 62 Although plaintiffs often have attempted to ground this cause of
action in contract as well as in tort, such attempts generally have been unsuc-
cessful.6 3 The claim traditionally is regarded as a medical malpractice claim64
in which the plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) a duty on the part of the
defendant; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) damages or injuries proximately
resulting to the plaintiff by virtue of the breach.65
Although most courts addressing the wrongful conception issue have ruled
that a cognizable claim exists, 66 the assessment of damages has not been uni-
form. Earlier cases adopted the "blessing concept" 67 and refused to award dam-
ages for wrongful conception on the theory that the birth of a child is always an
"esteemed right" rather than a compensable wrong. 68 Shaheen v. Knight,69 a
Pennsylvania case, was the first case to address the damages issue squarely.70 In
Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975); Milde v. Leigh, 75 N.D. 418, 28
N.W.2d 530 (1947); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985).
62. See O'Toole v. Greenberg, 64 N.Y.2d 427, 477 N.E.2d 445, 488 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1985); Ab-
bariao v. Blumenthal, 107 A.D.2d 556, 483 N.Y.S.2d 296 (1985); Sala v. Tomlinson, 73 A.D.2d 724,
422 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1979); Clegg v. Chase, 89 Misc. 2d 510, 391 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1977); Terrell v.
Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974). In South Dakota
an action for wrongful conception is barred by statute. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-55-1 (Supp.
1986).
63. Contract claims usually are denied by courts on the grounds that physicians do not warrant
the outcome of their treatment, absent a special agreement to that effect. See Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F.
Supp. 460, 463 (S.D.W. Va. 1967); Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377, 381 (Ky. 1971) (quoting W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 162 (4th ed. 1971)); Martineau v. Nelson,
311 Minn. 92, 94, 247 N.W.2d 409, 414 (1976); Clegg v. Chase, 89 Misc. 2d 510, 511, 391 N.Y.S.2d
966, 967 (1977). In addition, even if the physician does make such a warranty, the breach is not
actionable unless the warranty is supported by consideration "separate and distinct from the fee for
the sterilization operation." Id. at 511, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 967; accord Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Ill.
App. 3d 51, 63-64, 391 N.E.2d 479, 488-89 (1979); Sard v. Hardy, 34 Md. App. 217, 238-39, 367
A.2d 525, 537 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977).
Other causes of action brought in the guise of breach of contract are similarly disallowed. See,
e.g., Sanders v. H. Nouri, M.D., Inc., 688 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (alleged breach of
contractual agreement for sterilization procedure essentially strict liability allegation and not a basis
for recovery); Sala v. Tomlinson, 73 A.D.2d 724, 725, 422 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508 (1979) (breach of
agreement to perform sterilization in good, workmanlike manner and to exercise requisite level of
care rejected as essentially an attempt to plead as contract action one that is basically a malpractice
action).
64. Although most prenatal medical malpractice claims are brought under the collective um-
brella of negligence in the operation, two other alternative theories of recovery are lack of informed
consent and negligent misrepresentation-including negligent postoperative testing. See Note, Who
Pays?, supra note 11, at 422; see, ag., Gallagher v. Duke Univ., 638 F. Supp. 979-80 (M.D.N.C.
1986) (physician negligently provided genetic counseling and information that induced couple to
conceive a child eventually born with severe disabilities); Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 445-46, 379
A.2d 1014, 1023 (1977) (physician negligently failed to advise plaintiff that tubal ligation might not
be 100% successful and to apprise her of more effective surgical methods, precluding plaintiff from
giving informed consent); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 171 (Minn. 1977) (sexual
relations resumed after vasectomy in reliance on physician's negligent reading of postoperative steril-
ity report, resulting in birth of healthy baby).
65. Garrison v. Foy, 486 N.E.2d 5, 7-8 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Macomber v. Dillman, 505 A.2d
810, 812 (Me. 1986); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Minn. 1977); Speck v.
Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, 364, 408 A.2d 496, 507-08 (1979), aff'd in part and rey'd in part, 497
Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981).
66. See Holt, supra note 4, at 785; cases cited supra note 61.
67. Note, Damages, supra note 11, at 1212-13.
68. Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Ill. App. 3d 51, 62, 391 N.E.2d 479, 487 (1979).
69. 6 Lycoming Rptr. 19, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (1957).
70. The first reported wrongful conception case was Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123,
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Shaheen plaintiff-father sued his physician in contract for the negligent perform-
ance of a vasectomy, which resulted in the birth of a child. The court held that
although a contract to sterilize was not void as against public policy, even if the
reason for sterilization was socioeconomic rather than therapeutic, 71 "to allow
damages for the normal birth of a normal child [would be] foreign to the univer-
sal public sentiment of the people."' 72 Underlying the court's decision was the
assumption that the purpose of marriage was primarily, if not solely, procrea-
tive.7 3 A policy favoring birth control, including sterilization and abortion, pre-
sumably contradicted this professed goal. It was not until the 1967 California
decision in Custodio v. Bauer74 that a court brought the no-damage rule applied
by the Shaheen court into serious question.
The current trend 75 is to allow some measure of damages for wrongful con-
ception.76 In those jurisdictions recognizing a cause of action for wrongful con-
ception or wrongful pregnancy, courts generally have taken one of three
approaches. The majority view adopts the "limited recovery" rule77 under
which recovery is restricted to hospital and medical expenses associated with a
future sterilization operation, pregnancy and childbirth, including pain and suf-
fering (both mental and physical), lost wages, and loss of consortium.78 A sig-
nificant minority of jurisdictions, following the "benefit" 79 or "offset" 80 rule,
permit recovery not only for these expenses, but for child-rearing costs as well,
offset by whatever benefits the child confers on his or her parents.8 1 The third
255 N.W. 620 (1934). The Christensen court denied the existence of a valid cause of action and,
therefore, did not reach the issue of damages. It mentioned in dictum, however, that the birth of a
child was a blessing from which no damage could arise. Id. at 126, 255 N.W. at 622.
71. Shaheen, 6 Lycoming Rptr. at 21-22, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d at 41-43.
72. Id. at 23, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d at 45.
73. Id.
74. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); see infra text accompanying notes 92-100
(discussing Custodio).
75. The Supreme Court decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), respectively, validating the individual's right to practice contraception
and to have an abortion were instrumental in establishing the principle that one has a fundamental
right not to conceive or bear a child. The now well-developed idea of procreative autonomy logically
led to the award of compensable damages for violation of these constitutional rights.
76. For an overview of three measures of damages for the birth of a normal, healthy child in a
wrongful conception case, see Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 290-91 (Wyo. 1982).
77. Note, Damages, supra note 11, at 1218.
78. See, eg., Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W. Va. 1967); Boone v. Mullendore, 416
So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982), Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982); Coleman v. Garrison,
349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980);
Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 314 S.E.2d 653 (1984); Macomber v. Dillman,
505 A.2d 810 (Me. 1986); Bushman v. Burns Clinic Medical Center, 83 Mich. App. 453, 268
N.W.2d 683 (1978); Miller v. Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Kingsbury v. Smith,
122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (1981);
Weintraub v. Brown, 98 A.D.2d 339, 470 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1983); McKernan v. Aasheim, 102 Wash.
2d 411, 687 P.2d 850 (1984); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985); Rieck v. Medical
Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo.
1982).
79. Note, Damages, supra note 11, at 1215-18.
80. Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 293 (Wyo. 1982).
81. See, eg., Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983);
University of Arizona Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 667 P.2d 1294
(1983); Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976); Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn.
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and most liberal damages rule, suggested by the California Court of Appeal in
Custodio, grants full recovery for the expenses of raising the child, subject to no
offset.8 2
The reasons for a court's decision whether to grant parents relief for wrong-
ful conception are complex and often sensitive, involving serious ethical and
moral issues in addition to the typical questions of tort and contract liability. In
Coleman v. Garrison,8 3 a leading case denying child-rearing costs, the Delaware
Superior Court held that the value of a human life would always outweigh any
damage resulting from the fact of birth.84 In refusing to recognize the birth of a
child as an injury for which parents might recover damages, the court reasoned:
The preciousness of human life should not be held to vary with the
circumstances surrounding birth. To make such a determination
would, indeed, raise the unfortunate prospect of ruling, as a matter of
law, that under certain circumstances a child would not be worth the
trouble and expense necessary to bring him into the world.8 5
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling, and also ex-
pressed its concern over the possibility of a negative effect on the child's psyche,
should the child discover that he or she was unwanted when conceived.8 6
Key to the lower court's ruling in Coleman that the benefits of raising the
child outweigh any hardship was plaintiffs' decision to raise the child rather than
mitigate their damages,8 7 presumably by aborting the child at the fetal stage or
253, 445 A.2d 883 (1982); Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 126, 366 A.2d 204 (1976); Jones
v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429 (1984); Clapham v. Yanga, 102 Mich. App. 47, 300
N.W.2d 727 (1980); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Sherlock v. Still-
water Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336
(1975).
82. Custodio was a demurrer case and did not explicitly apply a full recovery rule. Rather, the
court noted that if plaintiffs established liability "they have established a right to more than nominal
damages." Custodio, 251 Cal. App. 2d at 325, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477. The court did note, however,
that when tortious conduct is established, "the measure of damages.., is the amount which will
compensate for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated
or not." Id. Custodio has been interpreted and followed in other California cases as advocating full
recovery. See, eg., Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 709, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652, 658 (1976) ("In
our opinion the holding in Custodio correctly states the law of this state and... clearly demonstrates
the weakness of the policy arguments which would limit full compensation recoverable for tort
Full recovery for such torts is rare. Ohio and Pennsylvania apparently are the only other states
besides California that follow this rule. See, eg., Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d
496 (1976) (mother who gave birth to twins, one of whom was disabled, following unsuccessful tubal
ligation allowed to recover for all foreseeable consequences of negligently performed sterilization
operation, including costs of raising the children); Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110
(1981) (parents of genetically defective child entitled to recover not only for childbirth and child-
rearing expenses, but also for emotional distress incident to birth and raising of child). Pennsylvania
formerly had adhered to a stricter standard, denying recovery for attendant mental pain and suffer-
ing. See Stribling v. deQuevedo, 288 Pa. Super. 436,432 A.2d 239 (1980); Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa.
Super. 342, 408 A.2d 496 (1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981).
83. 327 A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), modified and aff'd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975).
84. Id. at 761.
85. Id.
86. Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 14 (Del. 1975); see also Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239,
242, 628 S.W.2d 568, 570 (1982) (noting the possibility of emotional harm to child who knows that
cost of his or her upbringing was paid for by a third party).
87. Coleman, 327 A.2d at 761. The requirement that plaintiffs mitigate their damages in order
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placing it for adoption following birth. The court found it unreasonable to hold
a physician liable for child support "when the plaintiffs choose to raise the child
even where other lawful alternatives are available."8 8 As to damages, the court
denied child-rearing costs based on their speculative nature,8 9 but noted that a
mother could recover damages in connection with her unexpected pregnancy
when the avoidable pregnancy had resulted from a faulty medical procedure. 90
In so holding, the court noted that to rule otherwise "would leave the medical
profession virtually immune from liability for improper treatment of patients
justifiable [sic] seeking to avoid pregnancy." 91 According to the Coleman court,
although public policy dictated that parents alleging wrongful conception or
wrongful pregnancy be barred as a matter of law from recovering expenditures
for the maintenance and upbringing of their child, a straight negligence analysis
permitted recovery of pregnancy-related costs that were readily ascertainable
and directly linked to the physician's negligence.
The flip side of the public policy coin was eloquently represented in Cus-
todio, the first case in which a court recognized that damages in a wrongful
conception case might be "more than nominal."'92 Plaintiff in Custodio, a wo-
man who had undergone a tubal ligation for medical and economic reasons, later
became pregnant and brought suit against her physician for negligence, misrep-
resentation, and breach of contract. Rejecting the sentiment-as espoused in
Shaheen and implied in Christensen v. Thornby 9 3-that the benefits of rearing a
child always outweigh the detriments, the Custodio court noted that in some
circumstances "the birth of a child may be something less than a blessed
event." 94 The court reversed and remanded the trial court's judgment of dismis-
sal, holding that plaintiffs might be entitled to recover all damages proximately
caused by defendant's breach.95 In support of such a result the court reasoned
that the public policy supporting family "social ethics" no longer acted as a bar
to awarding child-rearing costs for wrongful conception. The court noted:
With fears being echoed that Malthus was indeed right, there is
some trend of change in social ethics with respect to the family estab-
lishment. City, state and federal agencies have instituted programs for
to obtain a full measure of recovery is also known as the avoidable consequences doctrine. This tort
law rule specifies that "one injured by the tort of another is not entitled to recover damages for any
harm that he could have avoided by the use of reasonable effort or expenditure after the commission
of the tort." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 (1979). For discussion of the application of
the avoidable consequences doctrine in prenatal tort claims, see Note, Wrongful Birth, supra note 11.
88. Coleman, 327 A.2d at 761; see also Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 518,
219 N.W.2d 242, 244 (1974) ("To permit the parents to keep their child and shift the entire cost of
its unbringing [sic] to a physician ... would be to create a new category of surrogate parent.").
89. Coleman, 327 A.2d at 761.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Custodio, 251 Cal. App. 2d at 325, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
93. 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
94. Custodio, 251 Cal. App. 2d at 321, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
95. Id. at 325, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477-78. The Custodio court also discussed the possibility of
applying the benefit rule, id. at 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476, even though the opinion seems to favor full
recovery. See supra note 82.
1987]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
dispensing of contraceptive information with a view toward economic
betterment of segments of the population.
One cannot categorically say whether the tenth arrival in the Cus-
todio family will be more emotionally upset if he arrives in an environ-
ment where each of the other members of the family must contribute
to his support, or whether he will have a happier and more well-ad-
justed life if he brings with him the wherewithal to make it possible. 96
The Custodio court hinted also that plaintiffs' failure to mitigate their dam-
ages would not preclude recovery, noting that "[tihe suggestion in Shaheen that
the child be considered as worth its cost or be put out for adoption is not consis-
tent with the very same stability of the family which the same court relies on to
support its views of 'universal public sentiment.' ,97 Today, courts uniformly
reject the argument that parents must select either adoption or abortion as a
method of mitigation, on the premise that forcing such a choice" 'meddles with
the concept of life and the stability of the family unit.' "98 Although parents
who practice contraception do so with the express purpose of avoiding preg-
nancy, a different set of considerations arises once conception occurs. The deci-
sion to abort a child or give it up for adoption is a highly personal matter that
often involves moral or religious issues. A desire to avoid pregnancy through
the practice of contraception does not automatically translate into a willingness
to abort or place the child for adoption should that desire be thwarted. The
court in Custodio also dismissed the possibility of emotional injury to the child
resulting from a damage award for wrongful conception, noting that such injury
"[could] be no greater than that to be found in many families where 'planned
parenthood' has not followed the blueprint." 99
The decision in Custodio marked the first time a court recognized that the
benefits received from the birth of a child would not, as a matter of law, always
outweigh the burdens incurred in his or her upbringing. The court noted that
"[w]here the mother survives without casualty there is still some loss. She must
spread her society, comfort, care, protection, and support over a larger
group.''1oo
Custodio's full recovery rule has not been well-received by most courts, pri-
marily because the parents are expected to derive some benefit from the child,
even though the child may have been unwanted at the time of conception.101
96. Custodio, 251 Cal. App. 2d at 325, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
97. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 69-73.
98. Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 723 (Ala. 1982) (quoting Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark.
239, 243, 628 S.W.2d 568, 571 (1982)).
99. Custodio, 251 Cal. App. 2d at 325, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477. Curiously, most courts denying
child-rearing costs on the theory that the child might suffer psychic injury if the child learned that he
or she was unwanted when conceived, have allowed damages for the expense, pain and suffering, and
loss of consortium related to the negligent sterilization procedure and pregnancy, reasoning that
these damages would not have an attendant negative effect on the child. See, eg., McKernan v.
Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411, 421-22, 687 P.2d 850, 856 (1984).
100. Custodio, 251 Cal. App. 2d at 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
101. Note, Who Pays?, supra note 11, at 428. The underlying rationale is that it would be unfair
to make the "physician... have to pay for the fun, joy and affection which plaintiff... will have in
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The "benefit" rule, 10 2 applied for the first time in 1971 in Troppi v. Scarf,10 3
represents a compromise between the overly broad full recovery alternative and
the more restrictive limited recovery rule. Plaintiff in Troppi had received a pre-
scription for the contraceptive Norinyl from her physician, but defendant phar-
macist allegedly filled the prescription with Nardil, a mild tranquilizer,
instead. 1° 4 When plaintiff subsequently became pregnant and gave birth to a
healthy baby, she and her husband sued the pharmacist not only for costs in-
curred as a result of the pregnancy, but also for the expenses of raising the child
to maturity. 105 The Michigan Court of Appeals held that in addition to the
usual damage award for lost wages, medical and hospital expenses, and pain and
suffering attendant to childbirth, the economic cost of raising the child, offset by
the dollar value of the child's services and companionship, would be allowed as a
proper item of damage. 10 6
Troppi is consistent with Custodio in its view that the birth of a healthy
child does not, as a matter of law, always confer an overriding benefit to his or
her parents. 10 7 Rather than applying Custodio's full recovery rule, however, the
Troppi court in its assessment of recoverable damages applied the "benefit" rule
as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the
plaintiff or to his property and in so doing has conferred a special bene-
fit to the interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the
benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to the extent
that this is equitable.10 8
Application of the benefit rule to wrongful conception claims is a fairly
recent phenomenon.'0 9 In the past minor children were regarded as economic
assets. The absence of child labor laws and extended higher education often
meant that children entered the work force at an extremely young age." 0 Be-
cause the pecuniary advantages of having a working child would usually out-
weigh the relatively low cost of his or her maintenance and education, it thus
followed that a wrongful conception claim would be economically impractical.
the rearing and educating of [the] child." Shaheen, 6 Lycoming Rptr. at 23, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d at 45-
46.
102. Application of the benefit rule requires the court to "[balance] like interests to determine
whether the tortious conduct, in effect, has benefited the plaintiff in some way." Note, Damages,
supra note 11, at 1216; see infra text accompanying note 108.
103. 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
104. Id. at 244, 187 N.W.2d at 512.
105. Id. at 244, 187 N.W.2d at 513.
106. Id. at 262, 187 N.W.2d at 521.
107. Id. at 254, 187 N.W.2d at 517.
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979). It has been suggested that earlier cases
such as Christensen, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934), and Shaheen, 6 Lycoming Rptr. 19, 11
Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (1957), actually applied this rule, but held as a matter of law that the benefits of
having a child were greater than the harm and, therefore, that damages were not recoverable. See
Note, The Birth of a Child Following an Ineffective Sterilization Operation as Legal Damage, 9 UTAH
L. REV. 808, 811 n.14 (1965).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 102-06.
110. Selders v. Armentrout, 190 Neb. 275, 278, 207 N.W.2d 686, 688 (1973). Selders involved
the proper measure of damages for the wrongful death of a minor child.
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In contemporary society, however, "[m]odern economic reality emphasizes the
gulf between the old concepts of a child's economic value and the new facts of
modern family life." '11 1 Filling the family coffers is no longer a factor in
childbearing decisions. In fact, children today are more often economic liabili-
ties than financially productive resources. The Connecticut Supreme Court in
Ochs v. Borrelli 112 noted:
[R]aising a child from birth to maturity is a costly enterprise, and
hence injurious, although it is an experience that abundantly recom-
penses most parents with intangible rewards. There can be no affront
to public policy in our recognition of these costs and no inconsistency
in our view that parental pleasure softens but does not eradicate eco-
nomic reality. 113
Similarly, the Troppi court noted a "growing recognition that the financial
'services' which parents can expect from their offspring are largely illusory.",114
It advocated a case-by-case application of the benefit rule, taking into account,
inter alia, factors such as "[flamily size, family income, age of the parents, and
marital status." 115 The court acknowledged the difficulty of computing dam-
ages in this manner, but held that recovery should not be precluded on that
basis.1 16 Although not advocating the full measure of recovery as suggested in
Custodio, the Troppi court thus held that when change in family status as a
result of the birth of an unplanned child could be measured in economic terms,
these damages may be compensable under a benefit analysis.1 17
Prior to Jackson North Carolina implicitly followed the majority view that
recognizes a cause of action for wrongful conception. In 1980, four years prior
to Jackson, the court of appeals upheld such a claim sub silentio in Pierce v.
Piver. 118 Plaintiff in Pierce had engaged defendant physician to remove a tumor
from her ovary, and at the same time, to perform a bilateral tubal ligation to
prevent future pregnancies. 19 She subsequently became pregnant and brought
action against the doctor for negligence and breach of contract.1 20 In addition
to pregnancy-related costs, plaintiff also sought compensation for the cost of
raising and supporting the child until the age of majority.121 The court of ap-
peals reversed the trial court's granting of defendant's motion to dismiss the
complaint, holding that the action was "basically one for medical malpractice,
sounding in negligence and breach of contract" and that a cognizable claim for
relief had been adequately stated. 122 The court did not reach the issue of dam-
111. Id. at 279, 207 N.W.2d at 688.
112. 187 Conn. 253, 445 A.2d 883 (1982).
113. Id. at 259, 445 A.2d at 885-86.
114. Troppi, 31 Mich. App. at 255, 187 N.W.2d at 518.
115. Id. at 257, 187 N.W.2d at 519.
116. Id. at 261, 187 N.W.2d at 521.
117. Id.
118. 45 N.C. App. 111, 262 S.E.2d 320 (1980).
119. Id. at 111, 262 S.E.2d at 321.
120. Id. at 111, 113, 262 S.E.2d at 321, 322.
121. Id. at 111, 262 S.E.2d at 321.
122. Id. at 113, 262 S.E.2d at 321-22.
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ages, however, and the parties subsequently settled out of court.1 23
Jackson marked the revival of the wrongful conception issue and placed it
before the North Carolina Supreme Court. 124 The court divided its analysis of
the case into three distinct claims for relief: (1) a claim by the plaintiff-mother,
stating a cause of action for wrongful conception;125 (2) a claim by the plaintiff-
husband, seeking damages for child-rearing costs to the age of majority; 126 and
(3) a claim on behalf of both plaintiffs for breach of an oral contract to retain or
replace the intrauterine device following surgery.
127
The Jackson court agreed with the prevailing view that wrongful concep-
tion is indistinguishable from ordinary medical malpractice. 128 The court fur-
ther indicated that "traditional tort principles" were applicable in its
determination of whether the complaint was sufficient to withstand a 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss.1 2 9 Assuming arguendo that the doctor owed Mrs. Jackson,
his former patient, a legal duty, the breach of which proximately caused her
pregnancy, the court held that a valid cause of action existed.1
3 0
Defendant in Jackson argued that under Azzolino all "matters inherently
incident to the creation of life, including any pain, suffering or expenses resulting
from the birth of a child, are ... not cognizable damages."' 131 The court dis-
agreed, stating that defendant misunderstood the nature of the claim in Jackson,
and furthermore, that defendant had misconstrued the court's holding in Az-
zolino.132 Azzolino, the Jackson court noted, involved claims for "wrongful
birth"1 33 and "wrongful life." 134 The alleged negligence in Azzolino had oc-
curred after the fact of pregnancy. The alleged negligence in Jackson occurred
before the fact of pregnancy. Although defendants' alleged postconception neg-
ligence in Azzolino was not actionable because "life, even life with severe defects,
cannot be an injury in the legal sense," 135 the same was not true for an act of
preconception negligence. Defendants' alleged negligence in Jackson contributed
to the pregnancy itself, an occurrence that plaintiff had specifically sought to
avoid. The court criticized defendant for "equating the condition of the preg-
123. Jackson, 318 N.C. at 188, 347 S.E.2d at 753 (Martin, J., dissenting). Judge Wells' concur-
ring opinion in Pierce indicated that although all pregnancy-related costs would be compensable,
child-rearing costs would not. Pierce, 45 N.C. App. at 113, 262 S.E.2d at 322 (Wells, J., concurring).
124. Jackson also represented the first time a wrongful conception claim was brought for the
failure to retain or replace an IUD. Most wrongful conception cases have involved permanent steril-
ization operations. See cases cited supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
125. Jackson, 318 N.C. at 175, 178, 347 S.E.2d at 745, 747.
126. Id. at 182, 347 S.E.2d at 749.
127. Id. at 183, 347 S.E.2d at 750.
128. Id. at 179, 347 S.E.2d at 747-48; see supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
129. Jackson, 318 N.C. at 178, 347 S.E.2d at 747.
130. Id. at 182, 347 S.E.2d at 747-48. On a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
on which relief can be granted, "all allegations of fact are taken as true but conclusions of law are
not." Id. at 174-75, 347 S.E.2d at 745.
131. See Record at 4, Jackson (No. 670A84).
132. Id.
133. See supra note 1.
134. See supra note 2.
135. Azzolino, 315 N.C. at 109, 337 S.E.2d at 532.
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nant plaintiff with the life of her child" 136 and held that "it is the fact of the
pregnancy as a medical condition that gives rise to compensable damages and
completes the elements for a claim of negligence." 137
Although the court was willing to allow an award of damages to plaintiff-
mother resulting from her medical condition, including hospital and medical
expenses, pain and suffering associated with the pregnancy, and lost wages, it
flatly refused to consider child-rearing costs as a proper item of damage. 138 Part
of the court's argument rested on its holding that Mr. Jackson did not have
standing to sue. 139 The court thus viewed the claim for child-rearing costs
solely as part of the mother's cause of action. 140
The Jackson court denied recovery for the economic cost of raising the
child to majority on two grounds. First, it extended its holding in Azzolino con-
cerning wrongful birth and wrongful life claims, that life could never be a legal
injury, 141 to claims for wrongful conception. According to the Jackson court,
"to permit recovery of child-rearing expenses would be contra to both the hold-
ing and the rationale of Azzolino." 142 Second, the court was unwilling to apply
the benefit rule to award damages in wrongful conception cases because of the
guesswork involved in determining such damages.14 3 Quoting Miller v. John-
son, 144 a recent Virginia wrongful pregnancy case involving an unsuccessful
abortion, the court queried: " 'Who, indeed, can strike a pecuniary balance be-
tween the triumphs, the failures, the ambitions, the disappointments, the joys,
the sorrows, the pride, the shame, the redeeming hope that the child may bring
to those who love him?' "145 The Miller court criticized the result in cases such
as Troppi in which the court admitted the difficulty of measuring the value of
offsetting benefits for the life of a wrongfully conceived child, yet imposed this
burden on the jury. 146 The Jackson court agreed with the holding in Miller that
the assessment of this value necessarily would be based on " 'speculation and
136. Jackson, 318 N.C. at 180, 347 S.E.2d at 748.
137. Id. at 181, 347 S.E.2d at 748.
138. Id. at 182, 347 S.E.2d at 749.
139. In North Carolina a husband's right to sue for physical injury to his wife is limited to a
claim for loss of consortium. Id.; see, eg., Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hosp., 300 N.C.
295, 266 S.E.2d 818 (1980). It is unclear whether Mr. Jackson could have sued for loss of consor-
tium. Consortium damages, however, would include only the cost of the loss of Mrs. Jackson's
services, society, and affection, and would not compensate Mr. Jackson for the cost of raising their
child.
140. Jackson, 318 N.C. at 187, 347 S.E.2d at 752.
141. Id. at 182, 347 S.E.2d at 749.
142. Id. The reluctance of many courts to award damages for child-rearing costs within a
wrongful life or birth context arises from the moral sentiment that human life is sacrosanct. See
supra note 47.
143. Jackson, 318 N.C. at 183, 347 S.E.2d at 750. Courts frequently have relied on the reason-
ing of wrongful life cases to support the argument that these damages are unmeasurable. See Note,
Who Pays?, supra note 11, at 429 n.85; see, eg., Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Terrell
v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974).
144. 231 Va. 177, 343 S.E.2d 301 (1986).
145. Jackson, 318 N.C. at 183, 347 S.E.2d at 750 (quoting Miller, 231 Va. at 187, 343 S.E.2d at
307).
146. Miller, 231 Va. at 187, 343 S.E.2d at 307.
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conjecture' ",147 and that plaintiffs, therefore, had alleged no recoverable
damages. 148
With respect to plaintiffs' breach of contract claim, the court held that no
such "contract" to maintain in place or reinsert the IUD existed. 14 9 The plain-
tiff-wife originally sought the doctor's services in treating her uterine bleeding.
She later retained him to perform surgery to treat her recurring abdominal pain.
The court found that "[taken as a whole with due regard for its character, ob-
jects and purpose," 150 the actual contract between plaintiff-wife and defendant
was to perform the two operations related to plaintiff's gynecological problems,
and that "[d]efendant's 'promise' to retain or replace the IUD was merely inci-
dental to this contract."' 15 1 Because there was no contract to reinsert or replace
the IUD, there could be no breach. Accordingly the court held that dismissal of
plaintiffs' contract claim was proper. 152
Given the distaste with which many courts have viewed the assessment of
damages in wrongful conception cases,153 the result in Jackson was predictable.
However, the Jackson court's reasoning is puzzling. The court acknowledged
that the case was basically a medical malpractice action to which the general
principles of tort law would apply. 154 The court correctly employed a standard
negligence formula in determining the existence of plaintiffs' cause of action, 155
but disregarded the rule of tort law that holds a tortfeasor liable for all damages
naturally flowing from the commission of the tortious act.156 In a traditional
medical negligence action, once the plaintiff proves the existence of a duty on the
part of the physician, the breach of which proximately caused the injury, the
physician is "legally responsible for the consequences which have in fact oc-
curred." 157 The conception and birth of a child through a physician's failure to
retain or replace an IUD is a foreseeable result.158 Because defendant's alleged
147. Jackson, 318 N.C. at 183, 347 S.E.2d at 750 (quoting Miller, 231 Va. at 187, 343 S.E.2d at
307).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 186, 347 S.E.2d at 751-52. The court noted that Jackson was the first North Carolina
Supreme Court case involving a breach of contract claim against a physician. Id. at 185, 347 S.E.2d
at 751.
150. Id. at 186, 347 S.E.2d at 751.
151. Id. at 186, 347 S.E.2d at 752.
152. Id.
153. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
154. Jackson, 318 N.C. at 179, 347 S.E.2d at 747-48; see also Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260
N.W.2d 169, 174 (Minn. 1977) (wrongful conception action analytically indistinguishable from ordi-
nary medical negligence action, in which physician breaches a duty of care to plaintiff with resulting
injury).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
156. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 41 & 42 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
157. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Minn. 1977); accord University of Ari-
zona Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 585-86, 667 P.2d 1294, 1300-01
(1983) (en banc); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 207, 447 N.E.2d 385, 392 (1981) (Clark,
J., dissenting), cert. denied., 464 U.S. 346 (1983); Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, 361, 408
A.2d 496, 506 (1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981).
158. See Custodio, 251 Cal. App. 2d at 316-17, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 472; Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650
P.2d 288, 294 (Wyo. 1982) (Rose, C.J., concurring).
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negligence was a proximate cause of Mrs. Jackson's pregnancy,15 9 plaintiffs
should have been permitted to present evidence of damages flowing from his
alleged negligent act or omission. The court's refusal was thus a departure from
the recognized standards of tort law.
Proximate cause is much more easily established in wrongful conception
cases than in other prenatal tort claims. 160 The main distinction is that the
injury alleged in a wrongful conception claim occurs before the fact of preg-
nancy. In wrongful pregnancy cases, in which the physician fails to diagnose
pregnancy or unsuccessfully performs an abortion, the causal link may be more
tenuous because the negligent act or omission occurs after conception. Simi-
larly, in wrongful life and wrongful birth claims, as well as in failure-to-diagnose
situations, plaintiffs are required to show that the child would have been aborted
had the defect been known.1 61 In cases involving either wrongful pregnancy,
wrongful life, or wrongful birth, the physician is not responsible for plaintiff's
pregnancy. Wrongful conception, however, involves negligence at the precon-
ception stage and the doctor's conduct is directly responsible for the result plain-
tiff had specifically sought to avoid.1 62 Application of the traditional negligence
formula dictates that "[w]here the purpose of the physician's actions is to pre-
vent conception or birth, elementary justice requires that he be held legally re-
sponsible for the consequences which have in fact occurred." 163
Courts taking a liberal approach toward damagesi" have been quick to
point out the distinction between a wrongful life claim, for which damages are
measured "on the relative merits of being versus nonbeing,"165 and a wrongful
conception claim, which simply is a garden-variety form of negligence. Public
policy questions are behind most courts' reluctance to award damages for the
159. Courts have uniformly held that the husband's part in contributing to his wife's pregnancy
is not an intervening cause that relieves the physician from liability. See, eg., Bishop v. Byrne, 265
F. Supp. 460, 463-64 (S.D.W. Va. 1967); Custodio, 251 Cal. App. 2d at 316-17, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
160. "When a person undergoes an operation for the purpose of sterilization, it is self-evident
that negligence may cause the occurrence of a subsequent pregnancy." Note, Wo Pays?, supra note
11, at 430 n.86. The same argument applies to temporary methods of birth control, such as the IUD
or the birth control pill, in which the intended purpose of the contraceptive measure is to avoid
conception.
161. See Holt, supra note 4, at 766.
162. The physician in Jackson argued that proximate cause could not be established because a
temporary method of birth control, unlike a permanent sterilization procedure, is not foolproof and
also requires participation on the part of the user. Jackson, 318 N.C. at 181, 347 S.E.2d at 749. This
view, however, has never been endorsed by the courts. See Troppi, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d
511 (1971) (wrongful conception claim brought for pharmacist's alleged negligent filling of birth
control pill prescription held actionable). Under established principles of tort law, "[t]he plaintiff
need not negative entirely the possibility that the defendant's conduct was not a cause, and it is
enough to introduce evidence from which reasonable persons may conclude that it is more probable
that the event was caused by the defendant than that it was not." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
156, § 41, at 269.
163. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Minn. 1977) (citing W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs §§ 41 & 42 (4th ed. 1971)).
164. See cases cited supra notes 81-82.
165. Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 45, 356 N.E.2d 496, 499 (1976).
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expenditures involved in raising a child. 166 However, it is debatable whether
philosophical or moral considerations should be allowed to override established
principles of tort law. One commentator has noted: "[T]he argument that there
can be no injury by virtue of the birth of a healthy child may be a reasonable
statement of personal values, but it is an untenable position for the law to
take." 167 If traditional principles of tort law apply, then the heart of the issue
should be compensation for damages proximately caused by the defendant's
negligence.' 68
The flaw in the Jackson court's treatment of the wrongful conception claim
is its erroneous reliance on the wrongful life/wrongful birth analysis in Azzolino.
In support of its holding that child-rearing costs are not compensable damages,
the Jackson court reemphasized that "'life, even life with severe defects, cannot
be an injury in the legal sense.' "169 The court assumed that the injury alleged in
Jackson was the continued existence of a normal, healthy child.1 70 Damages
thus were precluded because the court was unwilling to recognize human life as
being anything but beneficial. 171 The court erred, however, when it applied the
"value of a life" argument to a claim for wrongful conception. The court in
Custodio stressed that "the compensation is not for the so-called unwanted child
or 'emotional bastard'.., but to replenish the family exchequer so that the new
arrival will not deprive the other members of the family of what was planned as
166. Major policy considerations militating against awarding recovery for child-rearing costs
include the following:
(1) The benefits of parenthood outweigh the costs of raising a child. See Public Health Trust
v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084, 1085-86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 499 Pa.
484, 487, 453 A.2d 974, 976 (1982); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974).
(2) Recovery of child-raising expenses produces a financial windfall for the parents and places
an unreasonable burden on the negligent physician. Inherent in this argument is the sentiment that
shifting these costs to the doctor would be "wholly out of proportion to the culpability involved."
Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 518, 219 N.W.2d 242, 245 (1974); see White v.
United States, 510 F. Supp. 146, 149 (D. Kan. 1981); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 243, 442
A.2d 1003, 1006 (1982).
(3) The child's psyche requires protection. See Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 722
(Ala. 1982) (taking notice of the "stigma that will attach to [the child] once he learns the true
circumstances of his upbringing"); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 242, 628 S.W.2d 568, 570 (1982)
(subject child in a wrongful conception action often viewed as an "emotional bastard").
(4) Damages are too speculative to assess with any degree of accuracy. See Sorkin v. Lee, 78
A.D.2d 180, 181, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300, 301 (1980); Miller v. Johnson, 231 Va. 177, 187, 343 S.E.2d
301, 307 (1986).
(5) Allowing such costs may open the door to fraudulent claims. See Beardsley v. Wierdsma,
650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982); see also supra note 49 (noting the.Azzolino court's discussion of potential
fraudulent claims).
167. Note, Torts-Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life, 44 Mo. L. REv. 167, 173 (1979).
168. See Troppi, 31 Mich. App. at 245, 187 N.W.2d at 513; Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d
288, 293 (Wyo. 1982) (Rose, C.J., concurring). But see Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d
514, 517, 219 N.W.2d 242, 244 (1974) (public policy considerations form basis of court's decision
whether to impose liability).
169. Jackson, 318 N.C. at 182, 347 S.E.2d at 749 (quotingAzzolino, 315 N.C. at 109, 337 S.E.2d
at 532).
170. Id. at 182-83, 347 S.E.2d at 749-50. In Azzolino the injury alleged was the continued exist-
ence of the disabled child. Azzolino, 315 N.C. at 105, 337 S.E.2d at 530.
171. See Jackson, 318 N.C. at 180-83, 347 S.E.2d at 748-80.
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their just share of the family income."' 72 Wrongful conception, unlike a claim
for wrongful life, does not require a decision between impaired life or nonexis-
tence. The legal injury originates at the moment of conception,1 73 and at that
point the fact of conception itself becomes the injury. The harm, therefore, is not
the continued existence of the child, but the denial of plaintiffs' right to plan the
size of their family.
This viewpoint has constitutional support. In Griswold v. Connecticut 174
appellants challenged the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute that made it
a crime for any person to use any drug or article to prevent conception.175 Ap-
pellants, Planned Parenthood League directors, were convicted under an acces-
sory statute for giving information and medical advice to married couples
regarding methods of contraception.1 76 The United States Supreme Court re-
versed the conviction and held that a married couple's right to practice contra-
ception was protected by a "zone of privacy" under the Bill of Rights of the
United States Constitution. 177 This right was extended to unmarried couples
seven years later in Eisenstadt v. Baird.'78 In Eisenstadt the Supreme Court, in
holding that the right to practice contraception inured to unmarried persons as
well as married couples, reaffirmed the principle of procreative autonomy:179
"If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child." 180 To exempt physicians from tort liability for a negligent act resulting
in conception robs the parents of "the right to plan their family and to deter-
mine, within their abilities, whether and when they will have a child"; 181 thus, it
robs parents of the constitutionally protected right to procreative autonomy.' 82
Under this analysis the husband also has a claim for wrongful conception
172. Custodio, 51 Cal. App. 2d at 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477 (citing Doerr v. Villate, 74 Ill. App.
2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966)).
173. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 175 (Minn. 1977).
174. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
175. Id. at 480.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 485.
178. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). In Eisenstadt appellee was convicted for exhibiting contraceptive arti-
cles during the course of a university lecture and also for giving contraceptives to an unmarried
woman at the end of the lecture. Id. at 440. The existing Massachusetts statute restricted the distri-
bution of contraceptive articles to married couples.
179. One commentator has noted that procreative autonomy, or the right of individuals to de-
cide whether and when to bear or conceive a child, is a type of patient choice that is characterized by
a "heightened electiveness... where the special role of personal values or preferences causes a court
to have greater than ordinary concern about patient choice." See Shultz, From Informed Consent to
Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 264 (1985); see generally Robertson,
Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405
(1983) (identifying freedom to avoid conception and childbirth as one of several aspects of reproduc-
tion requiring legal protection).
180. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
181. Jackson, 318 N.C. at 188, 347 S.E.2d at 752 (Martin, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 Ill. App. 3d 271, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981), rev'd on other
grounds, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385, cerL denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983).
182. See Ochs, 187 Conn. at 258, 445 A.2d at 885; Troppi, 31 Mich. App. at 253-54, 187 N.W.2d
at 517; Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 46, 356 N.E.2d 496, 499 (1976).
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because the negligent physician also has invaded the husband's right of procrea-
tive autonomy. Justice Martin's dissent in Jackson noted that Mr. Jackson suf-
fered very real damages as the proximate result of the physician's negligence
because Mr. Jackson was responsible for payments to the physician and the arri-
val of the child affected him both emotionally and financially.18 3 The father's
standing to sue for child-rearing costs has been recognized in a number of
jurisdictions.184
Recovery for child-rearing costs is the most equitable remedy for infringe-
ment of plaintiffs' constitutional right to plan the size of their family. As a com-
pensatory measure it attempts to place injured plaintiffs in the position in which
they would have been had no wrong occurred. Moreover, allowance of such
recovery does not require the court to make an ethically questionable assessment
of the child's ultimate worth. As the Illinois Appellate Court in Cockrum v.
Baumgartner s85 noted:
Regardless of motivation, a couple has the right to determine
whether they will have a child. That right is legally protectible and
need not be justified or explained. The allowance of rearing costs is not
an aspersion upon the value of the child's life. It is instead a recogni-
tion of the importance of the parent's fundamental right to control
their reproductivity .... We cannot endorse a view that effectively
nullifies this right by providing that its violation results in no injury 18 6
The speculative or conjectural nature of damages is not a completely per-
suasive argument in wrongful conception cases. When liability is proven, the
potential uncertainty of damages for the pecuniary costs of raising a child should
not completely preclude recovery.18 7 Moreover, many courts have held that this
situation is no different from others in which the trier of fact routinely fixes
damages for wrongful death, loss of consortium, pain and suffering in personal
injury cases, or emotional distress.188 Unlike the unmeasurable factors involved
183. Jackson, 318 N.C. at 189, 347 S.E.2d at 753 (Martin, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
184. See Ochs, 187 Conn. 253, 445 A.2d 883 (1982); Troppi, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511
(1971); Sherlock v. Stilwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Weintraub v. Brown, 98 A.D.2d
339, 470 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1983).
Those courts that deny child-rearing costs generally recognize the father's right to sue for medi-
cal expenses related to childbirth and loss of consortium. See Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460
(S.D.W. Va. 1967); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (1981); Milde v. Leigh, 75
N.D. 418, 28 N.W.2d 530 (1947). Other jurisdictions hold that the father's standing to sue is strictly
limited to a claim for loss of consortium. See Macomber v. Dillman, 505 A.2d 810 (Me. 1986);
Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982).
185. 99 Ill. App. 3d 271, 425 N.E.2d 968, rev'd, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1981), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983). Although the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's
holding that child-rearing costs were a proper element of damages in a wrongful conception case, the
appellate court's opinion provides a cogent formulation of the competing policy considerations that
other courts have used in allowing such costs.
186. Cockrum, 99 Ill. App. 3d at 273, 425 N.E.2d at 970.
187. See Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 126, 129, 366 A.2d 204, 206 (1976); Green v.
Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 545, 547-48, 265 N.W.2d 411, 412 (1978); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J.
Super. 69, 76, 344 A.2d 336, 340 (1975).
188. See Note, Who Pays?, supra note 11, at 430; see, eg., Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983); Ochs, 187 Conn. 253, 445 A.2d 883 (1982). The
counterargument to this proposition is that, at least in wrongful death or loss of consortium cases,
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in assessing liability for a wrongful life or wrongful birth case, in which the
parent receives some benefit from the birth of a child, but suffers losses through
the child's disability, the elements of benefit and loss in a wrongful conception
case are separate. 189 "The loss is the financial expense which plaintiffs sought to
obviate by submitting to surgery. The benefit is whatever ... has accrued to
plaintiffs as a result of the newborn child. These are relatively tangible and mea-
surable factors... ."190 On the other hand, some courts have declined to apply
the benefit rule to wrongful conception cases on the theory that such benefits
were incalculable, with no ascertainable dollar value. 19 1 Application of an off-
set, these courts have argued, would put parents in the uncomfortable position
of having to prove that the child was, in effect, more trouble than he or she was
worth. 19
2
Reliance on this theory, however, belies that the emotional rewards of
parenthood, " 'great though they may be, do nothing whatever to benefit the
plaintiffs' injured financial interest.' ",193 Indeed, there is a valid argument in
support of the proposition that the benefit rule is inapplicable to wrongful con-
ception cases and that a full measure of recovery should be allowed. The ration-
ale is that the benefit conferred on the plaintiff by virtue of the defendant's
tortious conduct may be considered in mitigation of damages only when the
benefit accrues to the same interest that was harmed. 194 Child-rearing costs are
a "direct financial injury" 195 to the parents, no different from pregnancy-related
costs, that are not alleviated by whatever benefits a child may provide to the
parents through his or her existence.
Although the Jackson court was correct in dismissing plaintiffs' contract
claim under the circumstances, 196 and in recognizing a claim for wrongful con-
ception, it unjustifiably created a new damages rule for what the court labelled a
traditional negligence action. The better approach, as Justice Martin noted in
his dissent, would be to allow the trial court to assess recoverable damages,
rather than to leave the supreme court to formulate an abstract rule based on the
the alleged damages are subject to proof because "the relationship (or services) upon the loss of
which damages will be based, has already occurred." Note, Recovery, supra note 10, at 352. Wrong-
ful conception actions, on the other hand, require courts to "determine the emotional benefits to
parents for a life and relationship not yet experienced." Id.
189. Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 74-75, 344 A.2d 336, 339 (1975).
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 293 (Wyo. 1982). The Beardsley court
compared the offset concept to condemnation law and noted that a child should not be treated as a
piece of property. Id.
192. See Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 723 (Ala. 1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d
757, 761 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), modified and aff'd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Public Health Trust v.
Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084, 1086 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); McKernan v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411,
420-21, 687 P.2d 850, 855 (1984).
193. Cockrum, 99 Ill. App. 3d at 274, 425 N.E.2d at 970 (quoting Kashi, The Case of the Un-
wanted Blessing: Wrongful Life, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1409, 1415 (1977)).
194. Id.
195. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 175 (Minn. 1977); see supra text accompany-
ing notes 111-14.
196. If the Jacksons had entered into a special contract for the reinsertion or retention of the
IUD, supported by separate consideration, a breach of contract claim presumably would have been
supportable. See supra note 63.
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"bare record of the pleadings." 197 The costs incurred in the child's upbring-
ing-including expenditures for food, shelter, clothing, and education-can be
readily determined. Although the value of a child's services and companionship,
which should be used to offset these costs, are not easily calculable, such diffi-
culty should not completely preclude recovery. The court in Jackson skirted the
issue of damages for the costs of child-rearing by misunderstanding the nature of
the injury. "It is not at all that human life or the state of parenthood are inher-
ently injurious; rather it is an unplanned parenthood and an unwanted birth, the
cause of which is directly attributable to a physician's negligence, for which the
plaintiffs seek compensation." 198 The benefit rule, although imperfect, clearly is
a better alternative to the inequity of no recovery at all for child-rearing costs in
wrongful conception cases.
RENtE MADELEINE HOM
197. Jackson, 318 N.C. at 189, 347 S.E.2d at 753 (Martin, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
198. Cockrum, 95 Ill. 2d at 206, 447 N.E.2d at 392 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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